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Cryptographic Protocols
Solution to Exercise 8

8.1 An MPC Protocol

a)
1. Every party P_i sends its input $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_m$ to the trusted party T, where $x_i = 1$ means 'yes' and $x_i = 0$ means 'no.'
2. T computes the sum $y = \sum_i x_i \pmod m$ (where m is a large enough modulus).
3. T sends the result y to every party P_i.

b) Let Z be set of (passively) corrupted players. Note that $|Z| < n$. In the specification, the adversary learns the output y and the inputs x_i of the corrupted players $P_i \in Z$. In the protocol, the adversary additionally learns the values x_{ij} for $i \in Z$ or $j \in Z$, and the values y_j for all j. We argue that these additional values do not provide any additional information to the adversary:

As $|Z| < n$ the values x_{ij} for $P_i \notin Z$ and $P_i \in Z$ are independent of inputs of the honest parties and uniformly distributed. The values x_{ij} for $P_i \in Z$ are uniform at random under the constraint that $\sum_j x_{ij} = x_i$. The values y_i are uniformly distributed under the condition that $\sum_i y_i = y$. Therefore, all these additional values could be generated using the information given in the specification.

c) The protocol is secure even in this case. The protocol will output some value larger than n. However, the same would have happened if the parties had used the TTP. Hence, correctness is not violated.

d) Sum protocol II is *not* secure against even a single actively corrupted player: If some player P_i does not send the same sum y_i to all other players, the uncorrupted players will output different values. This could not be achieved in the specification.

8.2 Types of Oblivious Transfer

a) The reduction is straight-forward: the sender sends $(b_0, b_1, 0, \ldots, 0)$ via 1-out-of-k OT, and the receiver picks $c \in \{0, 1\}$.

b) Alice and Bob use the following protocol:

Alice		**Bob**
$r_1 \in_R \{0,1\}$, $e_1 := b_1$	$\xrightarrow{[e_1 \mid r_1]_{\text{1-2-OT}}}$	if $c = 1$, pick e_1, else r_1
$r_2 \in_R \{0,1\}$, $e_2 := b_2 \oplus r_1$	$\xrightarrow{[e_2 \mid r_2]_{\text{1-2-OT}}}$	if $c = 2$, pick e_2, else r_2
$r_3 \in_R \{0,1\}$, $e_3 := b_3 \oplus r_1 \oplus r_2$	$\xrightarrow{[e_3 \mid r_3]_{\text{1-2-OT}}}$	if $c = 3$, pick e_3, else r_3
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
$e_k := b_k \oplus r_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus r_{k-1}$	$\xrightarrow{e_k}$	$b := e_c \oplus r_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus r_{c-1}$

Alice trivially does not learn any information about Bob's choice $c \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$. If Bob wishes to learn bit b_c, he needs to know all preceding one-time pads $r_1, \ldots, r_{c-1}$ as well as the value e_c. Hence, he cannot choose any of the values $e_1, \ldots, e_{c-1}$, and he has to choose the bit e_c. However, in that case he does not learn r_c and learns no information about b_i for $i > c$. Hence, even when Bob does not follow the protocol, he learns at most one of the k bits.

c) Alice and Bob use the following protocol:

Alice		**Bob**
$i \in_R \{0,1\}$		$j \in_R \{0,1\}$
$b_i := b$, $b_{1-i} := 0$	$\xrightarrow{[b_0 \mid b_1]_{\text{1-2-OT}}}$	pick b_j
	$\xrightarrow{i}$	if $i = j$, set $b := b_j$, else $b := \perp$

Alice trivially does not learn any information about whether Bob receives the bit or not. Moreover, it is obvious that Bob receives the bit with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and otherwise has no information about it.

d) Let κ be a security parameter. Alice and Bob use the following protocol:

Alice		**Bob**
$r_1, \ldots, r_\kappa \in_R \{0,1\}$	$\xrightarrow{\forall i : [r_i]_{\text{Rabin-OT}}}$	$\forall i$: receive $r'_i \in \{r_i, \perp\}$
$t_0 := \bigoplus_{i \in T_0} r_i$, $t_1 := \bigoplus_{i \in T_1} r_i$	$\xleftarrow{T_0, T_1}$	$T_c := \{i \mid r'_i \neq \perp\}$ $T_{1-c} := \{i \mid r'_i = \perp\}$
$e_0 := b_0 \oplus t_0$, $e_1 := b_1 \oplus t_1$	$\xrightarrow{e_0, e_1}$	$t_c := \bigoplus_{i \in T_c} r_i$ $b_c := e_c \oplus t_c$

Alice does not learn any information about Bob's choice $c \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$ since T_0 and T_1 do not reveal which instances of the underlying Rabin OT were successful. Furthermore, with probability $1 - 2^{-\kappa}$ there is at least one bit r_i the receiver does not learn, and, therefore, at least one of the one-time pads t_0 and t_1 is uniformly random. Therefore, except with probability $2^{-\kappa}$, the receiver learns at most one of the bits b_0 and b_1.

8.3 Multi-Party Computation with Oblivious Transfer

a) A possible generalization of the given protocol to the three-party case could be as follows: A computes the function table of $f(x, \cdot, \cdot)$ and sends it by OT to B, i.e., A and B invoke 1-out-of-$|\mathcal{Y}|$ OST, where A inputs the following vectors t_i:

$$\begin{aligned} t_1 &:= (f(x, y_1, z_1), f(x, y_1, z_2), \ldots, f(x, y_1, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|})) \\ t_2 &:= (f(x, y_2, z_1), f(x, y_2, z_2), \ldots, f(x, y_2, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|})) \\ &\vdots \\ t_{|\mathcal{Y}|} &:= (f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_1), f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_2), \ldots, f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|})). \end{aligned}$$

B receives t_y, i.e., the function table of $f(x, y, \cdot)$ for an arbitrary y. Subsequently, B sends C the received function table via 1-out-of-$|\mathcal{Z}|$ OST, where B inputs the $|\mathcal{Z}|$ values $f(x, y, z_1), f(x, y, z_2), \ldots, f(x, y, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|})$, and C receives $f(x, y, z)$ for his input z. Finally, C sends $f(x, y, z)$ to A and B.

b) The above protocol is secure if either A or C are passively corrupted, but not against an adversary who corrupts B. This can be seen by the following example: Consider the function $f : \{0,1\}^3 \mapsto \{0,1\}$ with

$$f(x, y, z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = y = z \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

In the protocol from **a)**, B learns after the computation of f whether or not $x = y$. However, B should learn this information only when the function evaluates to 1. Hence, the protocol does not achieve the property that the players receive no more information in the execution of the protocol than what they can compute from the output of f.

c) The idea is that A encrypts the function table $f(x, y, \cdot)$ for each possible y using one-time pad encryption and sends the keys to C (but not to B).

More concretely, the improved protocol works as follows: For each $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, A chooses a value $r_z \in \Omega$ uniformly at random (the one-time pad key) and sends it to C. Subsequently, A sends B the following vector (where x is A's input) by 1-out-of-$|\mathcal{Y}|$ OST:

$$\begin{aligned} t_1 &:= (f(x, y_1, z_1) \oplus r_1, f(x, y_1, z_2) \oplus r_2, \ldots, f(x, y_1, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|}) \oplus r_{|\mathcal{Z}|}) \\ t_2 &:= (f(x, y_2, z_1) \oplus r_1, f(x, y_2, z_2) \oplus r_2, \ldots, f(x, y_2, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|}) \oplus r_{|\mathcal{Z}|}) \\ &\vdots \\ t_{|\mathcal{Y}|} &:= (f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_1) \oplus r_1, f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_2) \oplus r_2, \ldots, f(x, y_{|\mathcal{Y}|}, z_{|\mathcal{Z}|}) \oplus r_{|\mathcal{Z}|}). \end{aligned}$$

That way, B can choose the row corresponding to his input y. Subsequently, B sends C the values $f(x, y, z) \oplus r_z$ (for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$) via 1-out-of-$|\mathcal{Z}|$ OST, and C chooses the value $f(x, y, z) \oplus r_z$ corresponding to his input z and computes $f(x, y, z)$ using the key r_z which he received from A in the first step. Finally, C sends $f(x, y, z)$ to A and B.

It is easily verified that the protocol is secure against a passive adversary B, as the function table of $f(x, y, \cdot)$ that B receives from A in the second step is completely blinded by the one-time pad encryption.